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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Appellant Gregory Kelly'spro se
petition for post-conviction relief. Clerk's Record (CR) 97.

B. Procedural Historv and Statement of Facts
Gregory Kelly was convicted, following a guilty plea, of two counts of conspiracy to
traffic in methamphetamine and sentenced to a term of eight years fixed followed by twelve years
indeterminate. According to Mr. Kelly, he did not file a direct appeal, but he did file a Rule 35
motion for reduction of sentence. When Rule 35 relief was denied, he filed an appeal which also
resulted in no relief. CR 4.
On January 9,2006, Mr. Kelly filed a p r o se petition for post-conviction relief raising five
issues: 1) denial of effective assistance of counsel; 2) denial of due process;3) denial of the right
against self-incrimination; 4) denial of the right to a fair trial; and 4) prosecutorial misconduct.
CR 4.
In response, the State filed an answer asserting that the petition should be dismissed
because it was time barred. CR 34.
Mr. Kelly filed a reply asserting that since he had never received notice of a remittitur
having been entered in his Rule 35 appeal, his petition was not untimely. CR 37. A few weeks
later, Mr. Kelly filed a supplemental reply which included a copy of the Supreme Court remittitur
in his appeal. As the remittitur was entered on January 27,2005, and Mr. Kelly's petition for
post-conviction relief was submitted to prison authorities for mailing on or about January 5,
2006, Mr. Kelly's petition was not untimely. CR 46.

The State then filed a motion for summary dismissal. The motion stated only as follows:
Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through the Bonneville County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office, moves the Court to dismiss Petitioner's post-conviction
petition. Petitioner has no evidentiary basis to support his claims. Small v. State,
132 Idaho 327,331,971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1999).
Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact exists and the State is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

The State followed this motion with a memorandum. In this memorandum, the State
argued:
1) that issues dealing with testimony at the preliminary hearing, witness
tampering, and failure of counsel to impeach witnesses should be dismissed
because whatever happened at the preliminary hearing was superseded by the
guilty plea, and the manner of handling the preliminary hearing by trial counsel is
entirely a question of trial tactics or strategy and therefore not subject to attack in
post-conviction.
2) that issues relating to counsel's failure to obtain experts and investigate should
be dismissed because by pleading guilty, Mr. Kelly admitted facts which made
him guilty, Mr. Kelly failed to provide any admissible evidence as to missing
expert testimony or missing investigation, and attorney decisions not to obtain
experts or investigate are matters of trial tactics or strategy and not subject to
attack in post-conviction.
3) that issues relating to the PSI should be dismissed because there was no error
by counsel concerning the PSI and because, at the time he pled guilty, Mr. Kelly
knew he was waiving his privilege against self-incrimination.
4) that issues concerning whether the plea was knowing and intelligent should be
dismissed because the record demonstrates that Mr. Kelly was fully advised of the
consequences of pleading guilty before entering his plea.

5) that issues concerning counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal, even if true,
are immaterial given ail appeal was iiled.
Memorandum in Support Of Motion for Summary Dismissal, Exhibit on Appeal.

Mr. Kelly responded to the State's motion with a reply which cited specific testiinony
from the preliminary hearing and set out various other bases of support for his claims. CR 63.
The Court held a hearing on the motion for summary dismissal on September 27,2006.
Neither Mr. Kelly nor any representative on his behalf was present at that hearing. CR 69.
While the Court stated at the hearing that Mr. Kelly had not requested to be transported to the
hearing, in fact, Mr. Kelly had mailed a motion for transportation to the hearing from the prison
in Texas where he was being held some 10 days before the hearing. CR 71, Tr. 9/27/06 p. 4.
Following the hearing, the Court issued a memorandum decision and order summarily
dismissing Mr. Kelly's petition. The Court found the following:
1) sninmaiy dismissal of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was
appropriate because Mr. Kelly failed to support his claim that counsel was
ineffective in not attacking the credibility of witnesses at the preliminary hearing
with admissible evidence, failed to support his claim that his guilty plea was
coerced with admissible evidence, failed to demonstrate ineffectiveness in not
obtaining a fingerprint expert because he pled guilty foreclosing any defense,
failed to show ineffective assistance at sentencing
- because he failed to present any
evidence that he attempted to invoke his right against self-incrimination prior to
the PSI interview, failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance in threatening to
withdraw as counsel if Mr. Kelly did not plead guilty because case law states that
such threats are not ineffective assistance and further there was no evidence of
coercion, and failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance in not moving to
suppress evidence because Mr. Kelly provided no evidence that he had ever asked
counsel to make any motions to suppress.

2) summary dismissal of claims of the denial of due process was appropriate
because the record demonstrates that Mr. Kelly's guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary. Likewise, the Court found that summary dismissal of the claim that he
was denied due process when counsel failed to object to errors in the PSI
including use of the wrong counts to determine his sentence was appropriate
because there was no evidence that the Court was confused as to which counts
were to form the basis for the sentence.
3) summary dismissal of Mr. Kelly's claim that he was denied the right against
self-incrimination and the right to trial was appropriate because Mr. Kelly waived

those rights in pleading guilty.

4) summary dismissal of claims of prosecutorial iniscoilduct in giving four
witnesses speciai plea bargains in exchange for their false testimony against Mr.
Kelly was appropriate because the petition did not provide any admissible facts to
support the claim. Likewise, the claim of prosecutorial misconduct in
withholding information should be summarily dismissed because Mr. Kelly failed
to provide exactly what information was withheld and how it would be
exculpatory. Moreover, Mr. Kelly did not demonstrate how the withholding of
information would have prejudiced the plea bargaining process.

This appeal timely followed. CR 97.
111. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Given the vagueness of the State's motion for summary dismissal, did the District
Court err in suinmarily dismissing Mr. Kelly's petition without giving 20 days notice of the
reasons therefore as required by LC. 5 19-4906(b)?
2. In the alternative, as the District Court dismissed Mr. Kelly's petition on grounds other
than those offered by the State in its memorandum in support of summary dismissal, did the
District Court err in dismissing Mr. Kelly's petition without giving 20 days notice of the reasons
therefore as required by LC. 5 19-4906(b)?
3. Did conducting the hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal in the

absence of Mr. Kelly, and then failing to reopen the hearing once Mr. Kelly's request to attend
was filed, deny Mr. Kelly his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and access to
the courts?
4. Did the District Court err in summarily dismissing the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel in not obtaining a fingerprint expert and in not investigating the authenticity of a voice

on a tape recording held by the State insofar as the Court made a logical error in determining that
failure to investigate and prepare a defense is unrelated to effective assistance in cases involving
guilty pleas?
5. Did the District Court err in summarily dismissing the claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel at sentencing based upon counsel's failure to protect Mr. Kelly's coi~stitutionalright
against self-incrimination?
6. Did the District Court err in summarily dismissing the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel in failing to file a motion to suppress on the basis that to prove ineffective assistance
Mr. Kelly had to prove that he had requested a suppression motion and counsel had refused to
file one?
7. Did the District Court err in summarily dismissing the claim that Mr. Kelly was denied

his constitutional rights against self-incrimination on the grounds that there is no constitutional
right to self-incrimination in conjunction with sentencing proceedings following a guilty plea?
IV. ARGUMENT
A. Summan Dismissal Without 20 Davs Notice of the Reasons Therefore as
Required bv LC. 619-4906(b\ was Erroneous Given the Vameness of the State's
Motion for Sumrnarv Dismissal.

While petitions for post-conviction relief may be summarily dismissed if certain notice
requirements are met, LC. 5 19-4906(b) and (c), summary disinissal was not proper in this case
because the notice requirements were not fulfilled.
Summary dis~nissalof a petition for post-conviction relief is authorized under I.C. 5 194906(b) and (c). Those sections provide in pertinent part:
(b) When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion,

and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no
purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties
its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant
shall be given an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. . .
(c) The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements offact, together with any
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The reason for the 20-day notice requirement in subsection (b) is so that the petitioner
will have an opportunity to respond to the court's concerns. Sua sponte dismissals without the
20-day notice are not allowed. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,900 P.2d 795 (1995).

In this case, the State did move for summaryjudgment. But, rather than setting out
specific reasons for its motion, the State just made the general allegation that Mr. Kelly did not
have an evidentiary basis to support his claims. The State did follow this motion up with a
memorandum. However, as will be set out more fully below, the memorandum did not give
proper notice for a summary dismissal both because it too was vague and because the dismissal
was ultimately granted on grounds not set out in the State's memorandum.
The motion's vague allegation of an insufficient petition was not adequate to put Mr.
Kelly on notice of the specific grounds on which summary judgment was being sought. Thus,
this case was like Saylzhamchone, supva. In Saykhamchone, the State filed an answer to a
petition for post-conviction relief and in the answer's prayer for relief asked the court to dismiss
without further hearings. The Supreme Court held that this document was not sufficient to give
Saykhamchone notice of the grounds upon which dismissal was being sought. The Supreme
Court stated that ". . . at a minimum the state's prayer for relief in the Answer was deficient for

not stating its grounds withparticularity, and for not stating that it was the state's motion for
summary disposition under I.C. 5 19-4906(c)." 127 Idaho at 322,900 P.2d at 798 (italics
original). Therefore, summary dismissal without 20 days notice from the court as to the reasons
for dismissal was error.
Anderson v. State provides a succinct statement of the requirements for a motion for
summary dismissal.
It is well established that a petitioner is entitled to notice and an opportunity to
respond before his petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed. I.C. 5 194906(b); Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,321, 900 P.2d 795,797 (1995);
State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487,488-89,632 P.2d 676,677-78 (1981);
Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,892 P.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1996). If the dismissal
is based upon the state's motion for suminary dismissal, this requirement is met
only if the motion states with particularity the ground on which summary
dismissal is sought. Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322,900 P.2d at,798;
Christensen, 102 Idaho at 488-89,632 P.2d at 677-78. Broad and generic
contentions of deficiencies in a petition for post-coilviction relief do not suffice.
Frunck-Teel, 143 Idaho at 668-69, 152 P.3d at 29-30. Proper notice must refer to
specific allegations in the petition on a claim-by-claim basis, and specifically refer
to deficiencies in the evidence or additional legal analysis necessary to avoid
suinnlary dismissal of the claim. Id. at 668, 152 P.3d at 29. See also, Crabtree v.
State, 144 Idaho 489,494,163 P.3d at 1201, 1206 (Ct. App. 2006).
Anderson v. State, -Idaho at

,

P.3d at -,

2007 WL 3227294*7 (Ct. App. 2007),

review granted (2008).
In this case, although the State did label its document a motion for summary dismissal, it
did not state with any particularity the grounds on which it sought summary dismissal. Rather,
the State just said that Mr. Kelly had no evidentiary basis to support his claims. Just as in
Saykhamchone, such vague statements were not enough to put the petitioner on notice of the
reasons why dismissal was being sought and therefore not sufficient to allow dismissal without
20 days notice from the court under subsection (b).

Even if the State's memorandum is taken into account, proper notice was not provided.
As set out in Anderson, "Proper notice must refer to specific allegations in the petition on a
claim-by-claim basis, and specifically refer to deficiencies in the evidence or additional legal
analysis necessary to avoid summary dismissal of the claim." 2007 WL 3227294*7 at 7. The
State's inemorandum set out five arguments for summary dismissal, none of which were
sufficient to provide proper notice to apro se petitioner of the grouilds for summary dismissal.

In the first argument, the State asserted that summary dismissal of all ineffective
assistance of counsel claims relating to actions during the preliminary hearing phase of the trial
was appropriate because "whatever happened at the preliminary hearing has been superseded by
the guilty plea." Moreover, the State argued, "the manner of proceeding in the preliminary
hearing by defense counsel is considered 'trial tactics' or 'strategy choices' and therefore not
subject to attack on post-conviction proceedings." Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Dismissal, p. 4. This argument did not refer to specific allegations in the petition on a
claim-by-claim basis, nor specifically refer to deficiencies in the evidence or additional legal
analysis needed to avoid summary dismissal. Rather, this argument was a broad, and incorrect,
statement ofthe law apparently intended to address several of Mr. Kelly's claims at one time and
provided neither specificity as to which particular claim was involved nor specificity as to
deficiencies in the evidence or the legal analysis.'

In the second argument, the State asserted that all issues related to failure to obtain

'

This argument was incorrect because not every act by counsel in the initial phases of
representing a client, including acts at the preliminary hearing, is a matter of strategy or trial
tactics. Further, a guilty plea does not eliminate all consideration of counsel's effectiveness prior
to the plea especially when the plea might be entered based upon inadequacies in counsel's
representation.

experts and investigation should be summarily dismissed because Mr. ICelly failed to present any
evidence as to what the expert testimony would have been or what the investigatioil would have
revealed. Further, the State claimed, he could not establish prejudice because he pled guilty.
Finally, the State argued that the decision not to engage experts or conduct adequate investigation
is coilsidered to be trial tactics or strategy and therefore not subject to claims of ineffective
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal p. 5. Again,
assistance of cou~~sel.
this argument fails to comply with the standard ofAnderson as it does not refer to specific
allegations on a claim-by-claim basis, nor set out specific deficiencies in the evidence or
additional legal analysis needed to avoid summary dismissal.
In the third argument, the State asserted that issues dealing with the PSI should be
suinmarily dismissed because "there is no error on the part of trial counsel concerning the PSI. . .

. petitioner had the opportunity to review the PSI with his attorney. Corrections to the PSI were
made. . . . Petitioner also complains that he should have been Mirandized for the interview.
Petitioner, at the time of his guilty plea, was well aware he was waiving his privilege against selfiilcrimillation by pleading guilty." Memorandum in Support of Motion for summary Dismissal
p. 5. Again, this argument does not refer to specific allegations on a claim-by-claim basis, nor
set out specific deficiencies in the evidence or additional legal analysis needed to avoid summary
dismissal. Instead, it offers broad and often incorrect statements without offering any notice as to
what evidence or allegations are needed to avoid summary dismissal.

In the fourth argument, the State asserted that issues "concerning knowing and intelligent
guilty pleas" should be summarily dismissed because the record inakes it clear that Mr. Kelly
was fully advised of the consequences of pleading guilty and cannot therefore now claim

ineffective assistance of counsel. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal p.
6. Again, this argument does not refer to specific allegations on a claim-by-claim basis, nor set
out specific deficiencies in the evidence or additional legal analysis needed to avoid summary
dismissal. Instead, it offers broad and o&enincorrect statements without oflering any notice as to
what evidence or allegations are needed to avoid summary dismissal.
Only the State's fifth argument comes close to meeting the requirements of Anderson. In
that argument, the State asserts that the claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to file a
notice of appeal should be summarily dismissed in light of the fact that an appeal was filed and
an unpublished decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals.
In short, the State's motion was not sufficient to provide the notice required by I.C. 5 194906 prior to summary dismissal. Therefore, the District Court erred in granting summary
dismissal without giving further 20 days notice of the basis for the dismissal.
B. In the Alternative, Summary Dismissal Was Improper Because Mr. Kelly's
Claims were Dismissed on Grounds Other Than Those Set Out in Either the
State's Motion for Summary Judgment or its Memorandum in Support of its
Motion for Summarv Judgment.
The law with regard to motions for summary dismissals in post-conviction proceedings is
set out in Saykhamchone v. State, supra.

An application for post-conviction relief is in the nature of a civil proceeding,
entirely distinct from the underlying criminal action. The Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure apply. If the district court decides to dismiss the application, LC. 5
19-4906(c)requires the c o w to notify the parties of its inlention and give the
petitioner an opportunity to respond; failure to do so requires reversal of a
judgment denying the application for post-conviction relief. However, under LC
§ 19-4906 (c), when a party moves to dismiss the application without a hearing,
the twenty-day notice is not required.
127 Idaho at 321,900 P.2d at 797 (citations omitted)

Where the state has filed a motion for summary disposition, but the court
dismissed the application on grounds different from those asserted in the state's
motion, it does so on its own initiative and the court must provide twenty days
notice. Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758,653 P.2d 813 (Ct. App. 1982).

Sayklzamchone v. State, 127 Idaho at 322, 900 P.2d at 798.
In this case, the State moved to dismiss all claims in the petition because "Petitioner has
no evidentiary basis to support his claims." CR 60. As previously noted, but repeated here to aid
the reader, the State then filed a memorandum in which it argued for summary dismissal on the
followi~lggrounds:
1) that issues dealing with testimony at the preliminary hearing, witness
tampering, and failure of counsel to impeach witnesses should be dismissed
because whatever happened at the preliminary hearing was superseded by the
guilty plea, and the manner of handling the preliminary hearing by trial counsel is
entirely a question of trial tactics or strategy and therefore not subject to attack in
post-conviction.
2) that issues relating to counsel's failure to obtain experts and investigate should
be dismissed because by pleading guilty, Mr. Kelly admitted facts which made
him guilty, Mr. Kelly failed to provide any admissible evidence as to missing
expert testimony or missing investigation, and attorney decisions not to obtain
experts or investigate are matters of trial tactics or strategy and not subject to
attack in post-conviction.
3) that issues relating to the PSI should be dismissed because there was no error
by counsel concerning the PSI and because at the time he pled guilty, Mr. Kelly
knew he was waiving his privilege against self-incrimination.
4) that issues concerning whether the plea was knowing and intelligent should be
dismissed because the record demollstrates that Mr. Kelly was fully advised of the
consequences of pleading guilty before entering his plea.

5) that issues concerning counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal, even if true,
are immaterial given an appeal was filed.
Memorandum in Support Of Motion for Summary Dismissal, Exhibit on Appeal.
The Court then held a hearing on the motion for summary dismissal from which Mr.

Kelly was improperly excluded
Following the hearing, the Court issued a memorandum decision and order summarily
dismissing Mr. Kelly's petition. However, the reasons the Court gave for summary dismissal
were markedly differeilt from those offered by the state. As noted above, the Court held:
1) summary dismissal of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was
appropriate because Mr. Kelly failed to support his claim that counsel was
ineffective in not attacking the credibility of witnesses at the preliminary hearing
with adinissible evidence, failed to support his claim that his guilty plea was
coerced with admissible evidence, failed to demonstrate ineffectiveness in not
obtaining a fingerprint expert because he pled guilty foreclosing any defense,
failed to show ineffective assistance at sentencing because he failed to present any
evidence that he attempted to invoke his right against self-incrimination prior to
the PSI interview, failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance in threatening to
withdraw as counsel if Mr. Kelly did not plead guilty because case law states that
such threats are not ineffective assistance and further there was no evidence of
cocrcion, and failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance in not moving to
suppress evidence because Mr. Kelly provided no evidence that he had ever asked
counsel to make any motions to suppress.

2) summary dismissal of claims of the denial of due process was appropriate
because the record demonstrates that Mr. Kelly's guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary. Likewise, the Court found that summary dismissal of the claim that he
was denied due orocess when counsel failed to object to errors in the PSI
including use of the wrong counts to determine his sentence was appropriate
because there was no evidence that the Court was confused as to which counts
were to form the basis for the sentence.
3) summary dismissal of Mr. Kelly's claim that he was denied the right against
self-incrimination and the right to trial was appropriate because Mr. Kelly waived
those rights in pleading guilty.

4) sunxinary dismissal of claims of prosecutorial misconduct in giving four
witnesses special plea bargains in exchange for their false testimony against Mr.
Kelly was appropriate because the petition did not provide any admissible facts to
support the claim. Likewise, the claim of prosecutorial misconduct in
withholding information should be summarily dismissed because Mr. Kelly failed
to provide exactly what information was withheld and how it would be
exculpatory. Moreover, Mr. Kelly did not demonstrate how the withholding of
information would have prejudiced the plea bargaining process.

CR 73.
The Court's reasons for summary dismissal were clearly quite different from those
offered by the State in its inotion and supporting memorandum.
As set out in Saykhamchone and Gibbs, the District Court could not dismiss on grounds
other than those raised by the State without giving Mr. Kelly 20 days notice of its intent to act
thus allowing him time to bring fo*h allegatioils and arguments to support his claim. Because
the Court dismissed on grounds other than those asserted by the State without giving its own 20
day notice of intent to dismiss, summary dismissal of Mr. Kelly's petition was erroneous.
Therefore, the district court order dismissing the case must now be reversed and the matter
remanded for further proceedings.
C. The District Court Erred in Holdinn the Hearing on the Motion for Summary
Dismissal in the Absence of Mr. Kelly.
On August 30,2006, the Court mailed the Notice of Hearing to Mr. Kelly, who was being
held in an out-of-state prison. The record does not show when Mr. Kelly received the notice. On
September 18, 2006, Mr. Kelly signed a Motion and Affidavit for Order of Removal and
Transport requesting that he be brought before the Court in order to represent himself at the
hearing. The record also does not show when the Motion was mailed, but it was not filed until
September 29,2006. CR 71.
However, by that time the District Court has already held a hearing on the state's inotion
for summary dismissal in Mr. Kelly's absence noting that Mr. Kelly "has not requested to be
transported to Idaho Falls for this hearing or for attendance by telephonic connection." CR 69; T
pg. 4, In. 8-15. The District Court did not reschedule the matter for a contested hearing after

receiving Mr. ICelly's request. Instead, it issued a ~emo'randumOrder on October 19,2006,
three weeks after receiving Mr. Kelly's request to appear in person, granting the motion for
summary dismissal, noting that "Kelly did not request to appear at the hearing in person or by
telephone until after the hearing was held. Based on the record, this Court concluded that oral
argument would not elucidate the issues to be decided more than the written briefs." CR 74.
By holding a hearing where only the state was permitted to attend, and then refusing to
give Mr. ICelly a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and after hearing only one side of the issue,
the Court denied Mr. Kelly his constitutional rights to due process and access to the courts.
Idaho Const. Art. 1, 3 18; U.S. Const. Amends. 1 and 14.
A fundamental requirement of due process is that a person who is threatened with a
deprivation of life, liberty, or property be given an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner. Application ofDowning, 103 Idaho 689,692,652 P.2d 193, 196
(1982). And, in fact, the Post-Col~victionProcedure Act makes specific reference to the need to
allow an applicant to attend a hearing on a petition in some situations. See I.C. 5 19-4907(b);
see also, Lopez v. State. 116 Idaho 705,779 P.2d 19 (1989) and Conner v. State, 95 Idaho 413,

510 P.2d 308 (1973). In this case, the State's motion for summary judgment stated that summary
judgment was appropriate because Mr. Kelly had no evidentiary basis to support his claims. Mr.
Kelly simply could not rebut this argument without being present at the hearing on the summary
judgment motion. Moreover, as he was not represented by counsel, without his presence, no one
could argue on his behalf. Indeed, Mr. Kelly had specifically requested that he be allowed to
attend the hearing because he was not represented by counsel.

In these circumstances, holding the hearing without Mr. Kelly denied him an opportunity

to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. And, failing to reopen the hearing
to permit Mr. Kelly to attend, after it became clear to the Court that he wished to attend, and after
hearing the arguments of only one side of the case, violated his state and federal constitutional
rights to due process and access to the courts. In light of these violations, the order granting
summary judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
D. The District Court Erred in Summarilv Dismissinn the Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel Claim Regarding Failure to Preoare a Defense on the Mistaken
Conclusion that all Failures to Prepare a Defense are Remedied bv a Guiltv Plea.
The District Court dismissed the claim that trial counsel was ineffective in not obtaining a
fingerprint expert and not investigating whether a voice on a tape held by the State was really Mr.
Kelly's voice stating, "Because Kelly voluntarily pled guilty to two charges, Stucki was
foreclosed from presenting a defense of mistaken identity or presenting an alibi." CR 78. This
decision rests on the mistaken conclusion that a guilty plea automatically remedies all failures to
prepare a defense. Because of this mistake, the order summarily dismissing the petition should
now be reversed.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is properly raised in a post-conviction
proceeding. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,924-25,828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992).
To prevail, the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that he was
prejudiced thereby. Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 319,900 P.2d 221,227 (Ct. App. 1995). To
establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that his attorney's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id., citing Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,
760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable
probability that, but for his attorney's inadequate performance, the outcome of his proceeding

before the trial court would have been different. Id.
In this case, Mr. Kelly alleged that counsel was ineffective in not preparing by obtaining a
fingerprint expert and investigating the authenticity of a tape held by the State. The Court
summarily dismissed this claim based on its belief that by pleading guilty Mr. Kelly had
foreclosed the possibility of a defense based upon mistaken identity or alibi, and therefore any
failure to develop those defenses could not be ineffective assistance. However, counsel is
ineffective in advising a guilty plea without having fully investigated potential defenses. Hayes
v. State, 143 Idaho 88,92, 137 P.3d 475,480 (Ct. App. 2006). A guilty plea undertaken

following inadequate preparation and investigation by counsel does not eliminate the
ineffectiveness of counsel in not preparing and investigating.
The District Court holding to the contrary was erroneous. Therefore, the order summarily
dismissing the petition should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
E. The District Court Erred in Summarilv Dismissing the Claim of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Based Upon the Failure of Counsel to Protect Mr. Kellv's
Constitutional Right Against Self-Incrimination at Sentencing.
The District Court summarily dismissed Mr. Kelly's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in not protecting his constitutional rights against self-incrimination with respect to the
PSI proceedings stating, "Kelly does not provide the Court any evidence that he attempted to
invoke this right." CR 78. This analysis is incorrect. As made clear by Estrada v. State, 143
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007), and State v. Pevson, 145 Idaho 293, 178 P.3d 658 (2007), failure
to assert a client's constitutional rights against self-incrimination in the presentence investigation
proceedings may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. The District Court
was incorrect in summarily dismissing this claim.

Estrada holds that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel in deciding whether to
subinit to a psychosexual examination as part of a presentence investigation. Estrada further
holds that counsel's failure to advise the client that heishe has a Fifth Amendment right to refuse
to submit to such an exam could constitute ineffective assistance. Estrada v. State, supra.

Person stales, " A defendant's Fiflh Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
applies both at the sentencing hearing and in presentence evaluations." State v. Person, 145
Idaho at 298, 178 P.3d at 663, citing Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho at 563, 149 P.3d at 838 (2006);

State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215,217-19, 868 P.2d 1231, 1233-35 (1994); State v. Lankjord, 116
Idaho 860,871,781 P.2d 197,208 (1989).
Clearly, Mr. Kelly had a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination at the
presentence interview. Further, counsel clearly had a duly to inform him of this right and advise
him in the exercise of it. Therefore, the District Court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Kelly's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in not protecting his Fifth Amendment rights with
regard to the presentence investigation interview. For this reason also, the District Court order
granting summary dismissal must be reversed and the matter remanded for fwher proceedings.
F. The District Court Erred in Summarilv Dismissing the Claim of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Based Upon Counsel's Failure to File a Suppression
Motion.
The District Court dismissed Mr. Kelly's claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to
file a suppression motion stating, "Kelly fails to prove that that (sic) he made these requests [to
file a suppression motion] to Stucki and that Stucki refused his requests. Strategic or tactical
decisions made by trial counsel are not to be second-guessed on review, unless those decisions
are made upon a basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other

shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." CR 80-81. This analysis is incorrect. Mr. Kelly
was not required to show that he had requested a suppression motion and that counsel refused to
file one in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. By applying the incorrect analysis,
the District Court abused its discretion in summarily dismissing this claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Ineffective assistance of counsel is demonstrated when counsel's performance falls below
an objective standard of reasonableness which results in prejudice to the defendant. Hassett v.

State, supra. It is not necessary for Mr. Kelly to have spotted his attorney's deficiencies and
attempted to cure them as found by the District Court. A defendant is not required to figure out
on his own whether a suppression motion or any other motion is appropriate to his defense and
then ask counsel to file the motion. Rather, counsel's job is to independently make the
determination as to what motions are to be filed. When he fails to do so or when his
determinatioil to not file a motion falls below objective professional standards, then it is deficient
performance under Strickland, irrespective of whether the client has requested such a motion.
The District Court erred in summarily dismissing the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim because Mr. Kelly failed to provide a record that he had asked for a suppression motion
which counsel failed to file.
G. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing the Claim that Mr. Kelly
Was Denied his Constitutional Rights Against Self-Incrimination.
The District Court summarily dismissed Mr. Kelly's claims based upon the denial of his
constitutional rights against self-incrimination stating "However, Kelly gave up these rights when
he chose to plead guilty." CR 83. However, as set out above, Mr. Kelly retained his

constitutional rights against self-incrimination within the sentencing process per Estrada, supra,
and Person, supra. The summary dismissal of these claims was erroneous.
V. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, the order summarily dismissing Mr. Kelly's petition

*

for post-conviction relief should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted t h i a day of June, 2008.
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